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I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, post-mortem tax planning should be an extension of a
total estate plan. The goal of such planning is to leave the adminis-
tered estate with minimal problems and maximal tax savings.'
The personal representative is primarily responsible for marshal-
ling the assets-paying debts, taxes, and administrative ex-
penses-and then distributing the remaining estate to the
beneficiaries. 2 Tax planning, however, does not cease with the de-
1. See Brackney, Post-Mortem Tax Planning for Estates, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 581 (1979).
2. For purposes of this article, the definition of "personal representative" will be
that adopted by the Nebraska Legislature: "Personal Representative in-
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cedent's death, for the personal representative must make deci-
sions which affect not only the estate tax return, but also the
decedent's final income tax return, the estate's income tax return,
and income tax returns of beneficiaries for years to come.3
Unfortunately, the deceased may not always have had an estate
plan, or the plan may not have been fully developed to provide
maximal tax benefits. While the best opportunity to conduct valu-
able estate planning passes with the decedent's death, post-
mortem tax planning techniques are available to the personal
representative. 4
Post-mortem tax planning is especially important in the farm
and ranch context. The typical farmer or rancher enters into nu-
merous unique business arrangements with his employees, land-
lords, tenants, children, and spouse. To achieve maximal tax
benefits, these arrangements must be properly classified. One
method of classification is to treat a particular arrangement as an
informal partnership. However, taxation as a partnership is not
elective; rather, it is a consequence of the economic arrangement. 5
cludes executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special ad-
ministrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function ......
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2209(33) (1979).
3. See generally Walsh, Postmortem Estate Planning, 37 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N
44 (1979). Traditional post-mortem estate planning includes the planning of
the decedent's final income tax return, gift-splitting elections, fiduciary in-
come tax or estate tax elections, fiscal year planning, planning of estate distri-
butions, determination of the optimal time to terminate the estate, use of
disclaimers, and the planning of qualified retirement plan distributions. Id.
For a summary check-list of post-mortem elections, see Johnson, Post-
Mortem Tax and Estate Planning Elections, 42 MONT. L. REv. 199 (1981). See
also ASOFsKY, POST-MORTEM ESTATE PLANNING (P.L.L 1977); Bilson & Sorgen-
frei, Tax Problems Arising After Death, 25 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 531 (1973); Brack-
ney, supra note 1; Buttrey, Post-Mortem Tax Planning: A Guide To The
Elections Available to Estates and Beneficiaries, 40 J. TAX'N 148 (1974); Con-
way & Hale, After-Death Tax Planning-Tax Options, 301 TAx MGmr. (Portfo-
lio) (BNA) (1974) (withdrawn for revision); Frimmer, The Federal Disclaimer
Rule-E. Pluribus Unum?, 14 U. MAM INST. EST. PLAN. 11400 (1980); Shapiro,
Post-Mortem Tax Planning, 26 Tur. TAX. INST. (1977).
4. One commentator perceptively noted:
The post-mortem tax-planning techniques available to the execu-
tor are not set out in the Internal Revenue Code but are the result of
alternative courses of action available to the executor. The executor
[or personal representative] must consider the interaction of the
bodies of estate and income tax law with the selected tax-planning
techniques. The administrative problems and tax objectives are not
the same for any two estates, but because of the variety of tax-plan-
ning alternatives available to the executor, tax savings can be made
in practically all of them.
Brackney, supra note 1, at 582.
5. See Streng & Bywaters, Estate Planning After the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, 11-9th TAx MGmr. (Portfolio) (BNA) A-116 (1982). See generally W.
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Unfortunately, "the partnership is an illusive creature of the law
whose characteristics defy uniform definition and attempts to con-
fine the partnership to an ironclad definition of universal applica-
tion have proven fruitless."6 Most of the litigation relating to
partnership classification has focused on whether a particular eco-
nomic arrangement is properly classified as a partnership for tax
purposes, or more nearly resembles a nonentity relationship, such
as the relationship between mere co-owners, or between an em-
ployee and an employer.7
The recognition of informal relationships for estate tax pur-
poses determines whether the value of specific property will be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate.8 The impact that the
recognition of informal relationships has on the gross estate has
been magnified by recent changes in the federal estate tax law re-
garding the unlimited marital deduction, the increase in the ex-
emption equivalent, and the restructured rate of taxation.9
The $600,000 unified credit equivalent makes the division of
property between a husband and wife even more crucial than
McKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHIThmRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS ch. 3 (1977).
6. Bock, Farm Partnership Formation and Operation, 3 AGRIC. L.J. 504 (1981).
7. Nelson, The Tax Classifications of Partnerships: Distinguishmng From Arm's-
Length Economic Arrangements, 40 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx'N. § 15.01 (1982).
8. Compare Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978), with Kjorves-
tad v. United States, 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) $ 81-1635 (D.N.D. 1981).
9. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. Recognition of partnerships also
causes income tax ramifications. Specifically, problems arise when income
tax elections are made by the wrong party. One commentator has stated that
"[o] ne of the greatest dangers of failure to recognize that a particular ar-
rangement is or may be a partnership for tax purposes is that tax elections
may be invalid because they are made by the wrong party." Nelson, supra
note 7, at § 15.02[1]. Nelson lists at least 14 elections that must be made by
the partnership, as opposed to the partners. They include: (1) the election of
an accounting method; (2) the method of cost recovery under I.R.C. § 168, and
the recovery period under I.R.C. § 168; (3) the election to amortize the cost of
pollution control equipment under I.R.C. § 169; (4) the inventory method-,
(5) the election, under I.R.C. § 1033, to reinvest condemnation proceeds in
order to avoid the recognition of gain; (6) the election to treat the cutting of
timber as a sale or exchange; (7) the election to expense intangible drilling
costs; (8) the election, under I.R.C. § 179, to expense the cost of certain depre-
ciable business assets; (9) the election to defer cancellation of indebtedness
income under I.R.C. § 108(a) (5); (10) the election to expense land-clearing
costs under I.R.C. § 182; (11) the election of a taxable year; (12) the election
not to report gain on deferred payment sales under the installment provi-
sions of I.R.C. § 453; (13) the election provided by I.R.C. § 333 with respect to
the recognition of gain by qualifying shareholders in connection with certain
one-month corporate liquidations; and (14) the election, under I.R.C. § 266, to
capitalize interest and carrying charges. Id.
[Vol. 63:314
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under prior law.10 Before the recent estate tax changes, spouses
were encouraged to direct their estates primarily toward their sur-
viving spouses in order to take advantage of the marital deduction.
The marital deduction effects a deferral of estate tax until the sur-
viving spouse's death. The unified credit equivalent has made this
strategy anachronistic for a couple who holds property valued in
excess of $600,000. Such a couple should be advised to make use of
the unified credit equivalent allowed for each of their respective
estates. The waste of one unified credit, by a couple having com-
bined estates larger than $1.2 million, would result in an unneces-
sary tax liability of at least $222,000.11 Thus, while the maximum
use of the unlimited marital deduction results in deferral of the
estate tax, the result may be a significant increase in the aggregate
estate tax.12 Even though section 2523 has been amended to pro-
vide for an unlimited marital deduction between spouses for fed-
eral gift tax purposes, there may be an opportunity for significant
post-mortem estate tax savings for decedents who have failed to
execute new estate tax plans to take advantage of the recent
changes. It is possible to reduce a decedent's estate tax liability by
shifting property from the decedent's gross estate to an informal
partnership. Although the estate planner can shelter $1.2 million
of property by using a conventional by-pass trust,13 the prospect of
a more sharply progressive tax provides incentives to minimize the
10. See D. KELLEY & D. Lun'xx, ESTATE PLANNING FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS
§ 4.26 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
11. The $600,000 unified credit, multiplied by the 37 percent minimum estate tax
rate, equals $222,000. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion of the mathematics of the marital deduction and the
optimal allocation of property between the estate of the spouses, see
Reinders, Boehlje & Harl, The Marital Deduction: How Much Should You
Qualij?, 3 AGRiC. L.J. 262 (1981).
Commentators Backman and Frank suggest five factors to consider in de-
termining the degree to which the unlimited marital deduction should be
used: (1) inflation; (2) the age of the beneficiary, (3) the earnings on deferred
taxes; (4) the role of appreciation; (5) the use of gift programs. Backman &
Frank, Five Factors to Consider in Determining How Much of the Unlimited
Marital Deduction to Use, 9 EsT. PLAN. 194, 197 (1982).
13. The by-pass trust is "the basic structure of all arrangements which attempt to
give the surviving spouse the maximal benefit of property owned by the dece-
dent spouse without creating federal estate taxability of the survivor." D.
KELLEY & D. LUDTKE, supra note 10, at § 4.15. Generally, property held sepa-
rately by each spouse may be passed by will, revocable trust, or other devices
at death so that the surviving spouse may have the benefit of the property up
to the limits prescribed by Treas. Reg. § 20-2041-1(c) without its inclusion in
the gross estate of the surviving spouse. The Regulation describes the nature
of permissible retained controls and powers despite which the property will
not be included in the survivor's estate. D. KELLEY & D. LuDTxE, supra note
10, at § 4.16.
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value of property in both gross estates. 14 The maximum 50 percent
tax rate applies in an estate where husband and wife have prop-
erty worth approximately $2,250,000.15
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the interrelationship
between the recognition of informal family farm partnerships 16
and the determination of the property to be included in a dece-
dent's estate for federal estate tax purposes.17 This article will
briefly examine the structure of the estate tax system and proceed
with a discussion of the impact which the recognition of informal
family farm partnerships has on the computation of estate and in-
come tax.
14. See generally Simmons, The Real Estate Partnership Freeze in Light of the
Economic Recovery Act of 1981: A Guide for the Perplexed, 60 TAXES 476, 479
(1982).
15. Id.
16. The scope of this Article is limited to the recognition of informal family farm
partnerships. In recent years much has been written on the tax aspects of
partnerships as well as the use of partnership as an estate planning device.
The seminal works in the area of partnership taxation are W. McKEE, W.
NELSON & ?. WHrrMIE, supra note 5, and A. WILns, J. PENNELL & P.
PosTLEwArrE, PARTNERSHP TAXATION (3d ed. 1982). For excellent commenta-
ries dealing specifically with partnerships in the farm and ranch context, see
J. O'BYRNE & C. DAVENPORT, FARM INCOME TAX MANUAL (6th ed. 1982). See
also D. KELLEY & D. LurDTKe, supra note 10. See generally R. RICE & T. RICE,
FAMILY TAX PLANNING (1981); Dugdale, An Overview of Partnerships: An Al-
ternative to Traditional Planning, 42 MoNT. L. REv. 247 (1981); Nash, Family
Partnerships: A Viable Planning Alternative, 13 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN.
1000 (1979).
There are many sources which discuss the use of partnerships for the pur-
pose of freezing value in estate planning. See, e.g., Abbin, The Value-Capping
Cafeteria-Selecting the Appropriate Freeze Technique, 15 U. MIAMI INST.
EST. PLAN. 2000 (1981); Dual Capital Partnerships As An Estate Planning
Device, 39 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N. § 54.00 (1981); Partnership Capital
Freeze-An Alternative to Corporate Recapitalization, 13 U. MIAMf INST. EST.
PLAN. 1800 (1979); Schiefly, Partnership Recapitalization: Achieving A Cap-
ital Freeze, 32 S. CAL. TAX INsT. $ 500 (1980); Simmons, supra note 14; Com-
ment, Limited Partnerships: Estate Planning Vehicle for the Family Farm, 59
NEB. L. REV. 55 (1980); Comment, The Partnership Capital Freeze: An Exami-
nation of Control Retention by Donor Partners, 59 NEB. L REv. 709 (1980);
Comment, Estate and Gift Tax Valuation: Discounts of Partnership Interests,
59 NEB. L. REV. 737 (1980).
17. Federal estate tax can generally be divided into four categories: (1) the de-
termination of the property to be included in a decedent's estate and the val-
uation thereof; (2) the determination of the amount of deductions permitted
the decedent's estate; (3) the determination of the gross estate tax; and
(4) after the gross estate tax has been computed, the determination of the
credits allowed the estate in arriving at the net estate tax. D. KAHN & L WAG-
GONER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF GiFrs, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 3 (2d ed. 1982). See
generally 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1111 (1954).
[Vol. 63:314
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II. THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
A. History of Federal Estate Taxation
The federal estate tax was first adopted in 1916. The laws were
designed to enable the federal government to tax the transfer of
property at death. The tax is measured by the value of the prop-
erty transferred, and the rates are graduated.18
The federal estate tax of 1916, however, was not the first tax
which the federal government imposed on the gratuitous transmis-
sion of wealth.19 Earlier taxes were levied on the receipt of prop-
erty, rather than its transfer. Thus, the transferees of property, as
opposed to transferors, bore the tax burden. One obvious way of
taxing the beneficiary of a gratuitous transfer is to include the re-
ceipt of gifts, bequests, and inheritances in taxable income. This
was expressly done under the federal income tax of 1894. How-
ever, this form of taxation was in force for only one year before the
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional.20 The sixteenth amend-
ment,21 which became effective in 1913, enabled Congress to rein-
state the income tax.22 In doing so, Congress expressly excluded
gifts, bequests, and inheritances from taxable income.23
In New York Trust Co. v. Eis-ner,24 the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the current federal estate tax. The Court held that,
because the current scheme taxed the transfer of property, rather
than its ownership, it was an indirect tax and did not have to be
apportioned. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court,
18. See H. HARRIS, HANDLING FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES INCLUDING GIFT TAxES 4
(1959). See generally D. KAHN & L WAGGONER, supra note 17; J. LEWIS, THE
ESTATE TAX 1 (4th ed. 1979). For in-depth discussion of the general area of
estate taxation, see A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING (4th ed. 1980); R. STEPHENS,
G. MAXFIELD & S. INm, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gin- TAXATION (4th ed. 1978); D.
WESTFALL, ESTATE PLANNING LAW, AND TAXATION (1983).
19. Legacy and inheritance taxes are of ancient origin, dating back to the Roman
Empire. H. HARRIS, supra note 18. For a complete discussion of the early
inheritance tax, see M. WEST, THE INHERITANCE TAX (2d ed. 1908).
The federal estate tax was enacted in 1916, and, despite the fact that the
purpose of its enactment was to meet the "extraordinary expenditures for the
Army and Navy" during World War I, it has continuously remained in effect.
J. LEwis, supra note 18, at 1.
20. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
22. D. KAHN & L, WAGGONER, supra note 17. See J. FREELAND, S. LIND & It STE-
PHENS, FUNDAmENTALS OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION, 14-18 (3d ed. 1981).
23. "Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, be-
quest, devise, or inheritance." I.R.C. § 102(a) (1976). For proposals that
transfer taxes should be included in the income tax structure, see McNulty, A
Transfer Tax Alternative: Inclusion Under the Income Tax, 2 TAX NOTES 24-
27 (1976); Halbach, Accessions Tax Favored, 2 TAX NOTES 29-31 (1976).
24. 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
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relied extensively on Knowlton v. Moore,25 in which the Court had
similarly concluded, with respect to the federal inheritance tax of
1898, that a tax imposed on the transfer of property was an indirect
tax, and was, therefore, not subject to apportionment. 26
B. Estate Tax and Property Includable in the Gross Estate
Before entering the arena of estate planning theory and tech-
niques, it is important to discuss the structure of the federal estate
and gift tax.27 All property owned, in whole or in part, by a citizen
or a resident of the United States at the time of his death, must be
included in his gross estate to the extent of the value of his interest
in the property.28 In addition, various types of property, even
though not "owned" in the ordinary sense, must be included in the
gross estate.29 For example, property which is transferred with
certain "strings attached" must still be included in the transfer-
ror's gross estate.3 0 The Internal Revenue Code provides that the
gross estate must include the value of property transferred by a
decedent (excluding those transfers for which full and adequate
consideration has been received) where the decedent has either
retained the right to receive income from the property, or has re-
tained the right to determine its ultimate possessor.31 Further-
more, the gross estate must include the value of transfers of
property which do not take effect until the transferor's death.32 Fi-
25. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
26. D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 17.
27. Streng & Bywaters, supra note 5, at A-4.
28. I.R.C. § 2033 (1976). The Regulation to the Code provision states:
The gross estate of a decedent who was a citizen or resident of the
United States at the time of his death includes under Section 2033
the value of all property, whether real or personal, tangible or intan-
gible, and wherever situated, beneficially owned by the decedent at
the time of his death .... Real property is included whether it came
into the possession and control of the executor or administrator [per-
sonal representative] or passed directly to heirs or devisees.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (1982).
29. See Streng & Bywaters, supra note 5, at A-5.
30. Id. The value of the gross estate includes the value of property transferred
with certain "strings attached" within the meaning of the "transfer" provi-
sions. See I.R.C. § 2036 (1976) (transfers with a retained life estate); LR.C.
§ 2037 (1977) (transfers taking effect at death); LR.C. § 2038 (1977) (transfers
with a retained power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate). These provi-
sions apply primarily, though not exclusively, in the trust context. The value
of the gross estate includes the value of all property with respect to which the
decedent had, at the time of his death, a general power of appointment. See
I.R.C. § 2041(b) (1) (1939) (defining a general power of appointment).
31. I.R.C. § 2036 (1976).
32. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property which the
decedent has transferred (except for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), if possession or enjoyment of the property by an-
[Vol. 63:314
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nally, the gross estate must include property transferred by the de-
cedent where the transfer was subject to change upon the death of
the decedent.33
Three issues generally arise in determining whether a property
interest should be included in an estate.34 First, it must be deter-
mined whether a particular interest is subject to estate taxation.
Because of the expansive nature of Internal Revenue Code section
2033, this issue presents few problems for the courts. As such, it is
generally conceded that all of the decedent's property is taxable,
unless external factors such as state law or the peculiar nature of
the interest suggest a means for excluding the property from the
gross estate.35
Second, it must be determined whether the decedent had a suf-
ficient interest in the property to warrant its inclusion in the es-
tate. This is almost exclusively a question of property law. The
cases which address this question turn largely on common-law and
statutory rights.36
Finally, if it is established that the decedent had a sufficient in-
terest in the property, it must then be determined whether that
interest continued until the time of his death. This is the most dif-
ficult estate tax question3 7 as it involves interests which had begun
to accrue or had come into existence near the time of decedent's
death, but which had not yet come into the decedent's
possession.38
A decedent's partnership interest must be included in the gross
estate under section 2033. This result is clear under both the Code
other can be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and if the decedent has
retained a reversionary interest in the property, the value of which, immedi-
ately before his death, exceeds five percent of the value of the property.
I.R.C. § 2037(a) (1962). IR.C. § 2037(b) (1977) provides that, for the purposes
of § 2037, the term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the prop-
erty transferred by the decedent may return to him (or his estate), or may be
subject to the power of disposition by him; but the term does not include a
possibility that only the income from such a property may return to him, or
become subject to a power of disposition by him. As to the valuation of such
interest, see LR.C. § 2037(b) (1977); Treas. Regs. § 20.2037-1(c) (3) (1958). For
an in-depth analysis of I.C. § 2037, see Dodge, Transfers Taking Effect at
Death, (§ 2037), 256-2d TAX MGmT. (Portfolio) (BNA) (1981). For an in-depth
analysis of I.R.C. § 2038, see Knickerbocker, Lifetime Transfers with Retained
Powers, 50-3d TAX MGmT. (Portfolio) (BNA) (1980); Abramson, Retained Life
Interests, 133-3d TAX. MGmT. (Portfolio) (BNA) (1979).
33. LR.C. § 2038 (1977).
34. FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gint TAXEs EXPLAINED (CCH) 155 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL TAXES].
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id. at 157. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 158.
38. Id.
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and the Regulations. The Regulation states that "[tihe gross es-
tate of a decedent... includes, under section 2033, the value of all
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, and
wherever situated, which is beneficially owned by the decedent at
the time of death."39
The Tax Reform Act of 1976,40 the Revenue Act of 1978,41 and
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198142 effected significant
changes in the estate tax structure. The Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 had an immense impact on estate planners,4 3 as it
amended the marital deduction to allow unlimited tax-free inter-
spousal transfers after December 31, 1981.44 The dollar limitation
on interspousal transfers was eliminated by the repeal of section
2056(c). 4 5 Current law permits qualified terminable interest prop-
erty to qualify for the marital deduction.
The characteristics required for a qualified terminable interest
property trust are the same as those required for a life estate
power-of-appointment trust,46 except: (1) there is no requirement
39. Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (1963). The subject of valuation of a partnership
interest is beyond the scope of this article; however, for a brief introduction to
the topic, see Lawson, Family Partnerships, 346 TAx MGMr. (Portfolio)
(BNA) A-40 (1978). For a more detailed analysis in the farm and ranch con-
text, see Harl, Special Use Valuation of Farmland Under I.R.C. Section 2032A
With Emphasis on Planning to Meet Pre-Death Requirements, 16 U. MIAMI
INsT. EST. PLAN. 1500 (1982); Lewis, Farm Property Valuations, 38 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX'N § 39.00 (1980); Note, Material Participation and the Valua-
tion of Farm Land for Estate Tax Purposes Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
66 Ky. L.J. 848 (1977-1978).
40. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
41. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763.
42. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
43. Gingiss, Marital Deduction Planning Under ERTA '81, 60 TAXEs 269 (1982).
44. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 301 (eliminat-
ing I.R.C. § 2056(c); redesignating I.R.C. § 2056(d) as § 2056(c); amending
I.R.C. § 2523(a); and eliminating I.R.C. § 2523(f)). See FEDERAL TAXEs, supra
note 34, at 1001.
45. Gingiss, supra note 43.
46. Id. A similar provision is contained in I.R.C. § 2523 with respect to the gift tax
marital deduction.
The 1981 Act allows an estate or gift tax marital deduction for the
value of "qualified terminable interest property" if the donor or dece-
dent's executor [personal representative] so elects. Qualified termi-
nable interest property is property passing from the decedent to a
spouse who is entitled to all income from the property (or a portion
thereof) for life, payable at least annually .... No person, including
the spouse, can have the power to appoint any part of the property
subject to the qualified income interest to any person other than the
spouse during the spouse's life. However, the 1981 Act permits crea-
tion or retention of any powers over all or a portion of the corpus,
provided that all such powers are exercisable only on or after the
spouse's death. Further, income interests granted for a term of
years, or a life interest subject to termination upon occurrence of a
[Vol. 63:314
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for a general power-of-appointment, and (2) the personal represen-
tative must elect on the estate tax return in order to have the inter-
est qualify. If the surviving spouse is the only noncharitable
beneficiary of a charitable remainder trust, the beneficial interest
will also qualify for a marital deduction.47
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 also increased the uni-
fied credit 48 against the estate tax,4 9 starting with an exemption
equivalent 0 of $225,000 in 1982, and increasing annually to $600,000
in 1987.51 The minimum gross tax rate was increased to thirty-
seven percent for an estate in excess of the exemption equivalent.
The maximum rate was lowered to fifty percent, with an annual
reduction which will be fully effective in 1985.52
The tax treatment of joint tenancies between spouses has been
changed by the 1981 Act so that the estate of the first spouse to die
will include only one-half of the value of a qualified joint interest in
property.53 The 1981 Act simplified the definition of qualified joint
condition (such as remarriage), are not qualified income interests
under the 1981 Act.
FEDERAL TAxEs, supra note 34, at 1003.
47. Gingiss, supra note 43. See LR.C. § 2056(b) (8) (1981).
48. A single unified rate schedule and credit for estate and gift taxes now applies.
I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1981). The credit must be applied first to gift taxes on
lifetime transfers, and any remainder to the extent not used will be available
at death to offset estate taxes. FEDERAL TAXEs, supra note 34, at 15.
49. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 299 (amending
I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1976)).
50. The "exemption equivalent" is the amount which may be bequeathed or
given away without incurring a federal transfer tax. Therefore, the unified
credit which may be deducted from the taxable estate is transformed into an
equivalent exemption amount which may be used to reduce the gross estate
for conceptual planning purposes. See Gingiss, supra note 43, at 269 n.6.
51. I.R.C. § 2001 (1981). The credit will be expanded over six years as follows:
Year Credit Exemption Equivalent
1982 .................. $ 62,800 ......................... $225,000
1983 .................. 79,300 ......................... 275,000
1984 .................. 96,300 ......................... 325,000
1985 .................. 121,800 ......................... 400,000
1986 .................. 155,800 ......................... 500,000
1987 .................. 192,800 ......................... 600,000
The Act also amended LR.C. §§ 403(a)-(b), 691(c), 2012(b), 2056(b)-(d),
2523(a), and 2602(c) to create an unlimited marital deduction for gift and es-
tate tax purposes. Simmons, supra note 14.
52. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 300 (amending
I.R.C. § 2001 (1978)).
53. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (1981). Under prior joint interest tax law-
With regard to the estate tax, prior to 1976 the property was in-
cludable in the gross estate of the first to die except to the extent that
contribution could be shown by the survivor. Subsequent to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, if the property was a "qualified joint interest,"
only one-half was included in the first estate. To be a qualified joint
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interest. Under the Act, any interest in property held solely by
spouses as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, or as tenants
by the entirety is, considered a qualified joint interest. Thus, the
estate of a decedent who dies after 1981 will include one-half the
value of property jointly owned with a spouse, regardless of which
spouse furnished consideration for the property.54 Alternatively,
spousal property may be characterized as partnership assets, in
which case the decedent partner's estate includes that part of the
assets proportionate to his or her partnership interest.
I. DETERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP STATUS
A. Federal Tax Law Determinative of Status
Although federal tax law governs the incidence and rate of taxa-
tion, state law generally defines the existence of the property
rights which are subject to federal taxation.55 In many instances,
the applicability of state law is clear because the taxing statute ex-
pressly refers to state law.5 6 However, under some Code provi-
sions, federal law supersedes state law in order to provide a
uniform federal definition for a term which is also defined dispa-
rately from state to state.5 7 In most instances federal statutes are
silent as to the relevancy of state law. When federal statutes are
silent, parties must look to state law, for lack of other governing
law, in order to determine whether a requisite property character-
istic exists.5 8 The Supreme Court has ruled that in the absence of
a decision by a state's highest court, a federal court must apply
what it finds the state law to be after giving "proper regard" to the
decisions of the lower courts of that state.59 However, "proper re-
interest, the property had to be created by decedent and his spouse
as joint-tenants or tenants by the entirety, but only if the creation
constituted a gift (or, in the case of real property, only if an election
to treat the creation as a gift had been made).
Gingiss, supra note 43, at 276. See Campfield, Estate Planning for Joint Ten-
ancies, 1974 DUKE L.J. 669 (1974); Maxfield, Some Reflections on the Gift and
Estate Taxation of Jointly Held Property, 34 TAx LAw 47 (1980); Note, Estate
Tax Section 2040: Homemaker's Contribution to Jointly Owned Property, 29
TAx LAw 623 (1976).
54. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (1981); FEDERAL TAXES, supra note 34, at 503.
55. Streng & Bywaters, supra note 5, at A-4. See Doll, Partnership and Taxation
and State Partnership Laws: A Checklist of Problems, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAx'N 789 (1982); Sullivan, Conflicts Between State Partnership Laws and the
Internal Revenue Code, 15 TAx L. REv. 105 (1959).
56. For a general discussion of the interaction between federal estate tax law and
state property law, see D. KAHN & L WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 37.
57. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2041(b) (1939); I.R.C. § 2514(c) (1976) (defining the "general
powers of appointment").
58. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
59. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). In this case the outcome of the
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gard" does not necessarily establish state trial court decisions as
binding upon the federal courts. Instead, as the Court stated in
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,60 "where the federal estate tax
liability turns upon the character of a property interest held and
transferred by the decedent under state law, federal authorities
are not bound by the determination made of such property interest
by a state trial court."61
Although state law governs many property law questions, fed-
eral tax law controls issues concerning entity relationships. 62
Long before the 1954 enactment of subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code,63 the Supreme Court ruled that federal law was
controlling on issues involving income taxes. In Hecht v. Malley,6 4
and Burk- Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins,65 the Court held
that "Massachusetts Trusts" were "associations" within the mean-
ing of the Revenue Act of 1918, and, therefore, were taxable as cor-
porations even though they were considered partnerships under
state law.66 Thus, state law classification of an arrangement as a
partnership, does not necessarily establish a partnership for fed-
eral tax purposes. 67
In Commissioner v. Tower,68 the Supreme Court upheld the Tax
Court's denial of partnership status for a husband and wife despite
a partnership agreement which was valid under state law. The
Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that state property law
controversy hinged on whether a release of a general power of appointment
executed by Mrs. Bosch was invalid. If so, she would have enjoyed a general
power of appointment at her husband's death, and the trust would therefore
qualify for the marital deduction. While the Tax Court proceeding was pend-
ing, Mrs. Bosch filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New York for settle-
ment of the trustee's account. She also sought a determination as to the
validity of the release under state law. The Tax Court, with the Commis-
sioner's consent, abstained from making its decision pending the outcome of
the state court action. The state court found the release valid and the Tax
Court then accepted the state court decision as an adjudication of the prop-
erty rights involved, and therefore permitted the deduction. The court of ap-
peals affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed the decision.
60. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
61. Id. at 457.
62. See Comment, Informal Partnerships: Their Status Under Federal and State
Tax Law, 59 NEB. L. REv. 464, 468 (1980).
63. The federal income tax treatment of partnerships is set forth in subchapter K
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. For a detailed discussion of subchapter
K, see Spada & Ruge, Partnerships-Statutory Outline and Definition, 161-2d
TAx MGm'r. (Portfolio) (BNA) (1975).
64. 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
65. 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
66. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1925); Hecht v. Mal-
ley, 265 U.S. 144, 161 (1924).
67. See Comment, supra note 62, at 464.
68. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
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should control the validity of a partnership for federal tax pur-
poses, stating: "Michigan cannot, by its decisions and laws gov-
erning questions over which it has final say, also decide issues of
federal tax law and thus hamper the effective enforcement of a
valid federal tax levied against earned income."69
Even though state law is not determinative, it may be consid-
ered as a factor in determining whether a partnership exists for
federal tax purposes. In Buckley v. United States,70 a professor of
journalism and one of his former students had made an oral agree-
ment to share profits in a newspaper publishing company. Under
local law, it was not necessary that a partnership be predicated
upon a written agreement; rather, it could be inferred from the cir-
cumstances and conduct of the parties. Thus, it was clear that a
partnership existed under state law.7 1 The Tax Court expressly
considered the partnership status of the arrangement under state
law, in holding that a partnership also existed for federal tax pur-
poses. The court recognized the importance of state law, stating:
"[W] hether a partnership existed for federal tax purposes is to be
determined by federal law, although local law is relevant to such
an analysis. '72
B. Partnership Definitions
The federal system of taxation includes four distinct forms of
taxation: income taxation, estate taxation, gift taxation, and gener-
ation-sldpping taxation.73 Prior to enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976,74 the estate tax and the gift tax statutes operated inde-
69. Id. at 288. See also United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (hold-
ing that, despite its state law status, an association of medical doctors was
taxable as a corporation).
A husband-wife partnership may be recognized even if, under state laws,
the spouse may not legally become a partner. Rev. Rul. 58-243, 1958-1 C.B. 255.
70. 76-1 T.C. (CCH) % 9473 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
71. The professor exercised managerial prerogatives, negotiated financing for the
business, and permitted the business to be represented to the community as
a partnership. 76-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9573, at 84,313. See generally Comment,
supra note 63, at 470.
72. 76-1 T.C. (CCH) 9473 (W.D. Tex. 1976) at 84,313. See, e.g., Haley v. Commis-
sioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953).
For tax purposes the nomenclature under state law may have a
little influence because the question whether there is a partnership
will be decided by the standards of the Federal tax law, not state law.
A partnership under tax law is a much broader concept than the
common law or statutory entity found in most states. It includes all
joint ventures and will frequently embrace organizations that are not
partnerships under state law. (Citations omitted).
J. O'BY'RNE & C. DAVENPORT, supra note 16, at § 900.
73. D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 1.
74. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
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pendently. Each system had its own structure, rate of taxation,
and rules. The estate tax applied to testamentary transfers, while
the gift tax applied to inter vivos transfers. This dual transfer tax
system was modified by the 1976 Act which provided for both a uni-
fied rate schedule and a unified credit for estate and gift taxes. 75
Despite these changes, the structure of the system remains essen-
tially that of a dual transfer tax system.7 6
The federal income tax statutes govern many of the issues
which arise in the gratuitous transmission of wealth.7 7 Although
the Code specifically states that gross income shall not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheri-
tance,78 the exclusion from gross income does not apply to income
from property so received.7 9 The federal income tax also affects
the basis of property received gratuitously. 0 Finally, the income
tax rules govern both the income and deductions "in respect of a
decedent."8 1
Although there is a lack of symmetry among the four federal
taxes, the courts have generally applied the same tests in both es-
tate tax and income tax cases in order to determine whether a
partnership exists.82 It should be noted that tests applied under
75. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
76. D. KAHN & L. WAGGONER, supra note 17, at 2.
77. Id. at 1.
78. LR.C. § 102 (1976). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79. I.R.C. § 102(b) (1) (1976).
80. I.R.C. § 1014 (1976).
81. Section 691 (a) provides for the treatment of various income items as "income
in respect of a decedent." I.R.C. § 691(a) (1976). Such items are to be treated
as gross income when subsequently realized. They are also includable in the
decedent's estate for federal estate tax purposes. These rules apply, in gen-
eral, to items of income which have accrued in the economic sense to a cash-
basis taxpayer before his death, but which have not been received by him
and, accordingly, are not taxable to him under his method of accounting. The
purpose of such rules is to provide equality of treatment between cash-basis
and accrual-basis taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-(b) (1) (1982). For a
detailed analysis of income in respect of a decedent, see Miller, Income in
Respect of a Decedent-General, 32-2d TAx MGmrr. (Portfolio) (BNA) (1981).
I.R.C. § 691(b) provides that deductions for business expenses, interests,
taxes, and depletion which are not properly allowable on the decedent's last
tax return are allowed to the estate of the decedent in the taxable year when
paid. I.R.C. § 691(b) (1976).
82. Compare Krause v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir,1974); Payton v.
United States, 425 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970);
and United States v. Ramos, 393 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1968) (income tax cases),
with United States v. Neel, 234 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Eckhard v. Commis-
sioner, 182 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1950); and Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp.
378 (D.S.D. 1978) (estate tax cases). Another commentator has reached the
same conclusion in Comment, supra note 62, at 475.
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the partnership income tax provisions 83 look to whether the trans-
feree possessed dominion and control over the partnership inter-
est. The courts have focused on the substance of the transaction
and have held that "legal niceties" should be ignored. Instead, the
practicalities of the economic and social relationship are empha-
sized in order to effectuate the purpose of the federal income tax.8 4
However, "legal niceties" appear to be of greater significance in the
estate tax area under section 2033.85
The significance of "legal niceties" for purposes of estate tax
may be illustrated by the litigation concerning a Louisiana estate.
In Aldrich v. Usury,86 the court held that federal law controlled its
determination that no partnership existed. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that the estate tax issue was whether the decedent
owned a partnership interest under state law. It was not relevant
whether he was recognized as a partner for income tax purposes.8 7
On remand, the district court found that no partnership existed
under Louisiana law, therefore, the personal representative was
required to include the entire business interest in the decedent's
gross estate.88 The added requirements of section 2033 created a
distinction between partnership status for income tax and estate
taxation. Although it is important to recognize this potential differ-
ence in treatment, it is generally not of any great significance re-
garding the following discussion concerning the determination of
partnership status.
C. Distinction Between Informal and Family Partnerships
The Internal Revenue Code defines "partnership" by both in-
clusion and exclusion, stating that a partnership includes "a syndi-
cate, group, pool, joint-venture, or other unincorporated
organization through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on,"89 but excludes "a corporation,
trust, or estate."90 Like unrelated taxpayers, family members may
83. I.R.C. §§ 704(e) (1939), 761 (1977), & 7701(a) (2) (1976).
84. Lawson, supra note 39, at A-40.
85. Id. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
86. 211 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1962).
87. Aldrich v. United States, 346 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965).
88. Aldrich v. Usury, 256 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. La. 1966), affd per curiam sub nom.
City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 383 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1967).
89. I.R.C. §§ 761 (1977), 7701(a)(2) (1976).
90. Id. An informal partnership is recognized as a partnership for tax purposes
even though it has few of the common characteristics usually exhibited by a
formal partnership, i.e., formal written agreement, partnership name, etc.
The Regulations discuss four corporate characteristics for use in the clas-
sification of a business entity as a corporation or association. The Regula-
tions establish a relatively mechanical test by which an unincorporated
organization will be classified as a corporation. Such a business entity shall
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contribute capital or services for the conduct of a business and re-
ceive recognition as a partnership for federal tax purposes. How-
ever, the tax law also recognizes that family partnerships may
serve as a vehicle for taxpayers who wish to divide income or prop-
erty among related persons in order to take advantage of lower
progressive tax brackets or to escape taxation entirely.9 1 To pre-
be classified as a corporation if it has more of the significant corporate charac-
teristics than non-corporate characteristics. The four corporate characteris-
tics, discussed in some detail in the Regulations, are continuity of life,
centralized management in a representative capacity, limited liability, and
free transferability of interest. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1982). Generally, the
Regulations follow Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1931). The Court
in Morrissey noted the following characteristics of a corporation or associa-
tion: (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on a trade or business and di-
vide the profits; (3) continuity of life of the enterprise, notwithstanding the
death, disability or withdrawal of its members; (4) the opportunity for cen-
tralized management by representatives of the owners; (5) the privilege of
limited liability for the owner; and (6) free transferability of beneficial inter-
ests in the organization. B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 2.02 (1979). See generally Nelson,
supra note 7, at § 15.01; Fox, The Maximum Scope of the Association Concept,
25 TAX L. REv. 311 (1970); Lyons, Comments on the New Regulations on As-
sociations, 16 TAX. L. REv. 441 (1961); Zarky, Unincorporated Organizations
Taxable as Corporations, 13 S. CAL. TAX INST. 277 (1961). For a more detailed
treatment of trusts as associations, see B. BrrrnER & J. EUSTIE, supra at
2.03; Stephens & Freeland, The Federal Tax Meaning of Estates and Trusts,
18 TAX L. REv. 251 (1963).
The distinction between associations and partnerships becomes particu-
larly important in the tax-shelter planning area. See, e.g., IRS. Letter Rul
(CCH) 8304036 (Oct. 22, 1982); I.R.S. Letter Rul. (CCH) 8304013 (Oct. 19, 1982);
I.R.S. Letter Rul. (CCH) 8239152 (July 1, 1982); IRS. Letter Rul. (CCH)
8239151 (July 1, 1982); I.R.S. Letter Rul. (CCH) 8239141 (July 1, 1982); I.R.S.
Letter Rul. (CCH) 82318118 (June 28, 1982); I.R.S. Letter Rul. (CCH) 8201038
(Oct. 7, 1981).
For a discussion of two recent cases where the Tax Court recognized ar-
rangements as joint-ventures, rejecting the form of transaction asserted by
the taxpayers, see Tax Court Recognizes "Hidden" Joint Venture, 8 EST.
PLAN. 83 (1981).
91. W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHTrMIRE, supra note 5, at 1 14.01. "Accordingly
the tax law of family partnerships is essentially a reflection (or perhaps more
accurately, a refraction) of the assignment-of-income principle." Id.
The Regulations provide the following general guidelines in the context of
recognition of family partnerships for tax purposes:
The production of income by a partnership is attributable to the
capital or services, or both, contributed by the partners. The provi-
sions of subchapter K, chapter 1 of the Code, are to be read in the
light of their relationship to section 61, which requires, inter alia,
that income be taxed to the person who earns it through his own la-
bor and skill and the utilization of his own capital.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (i) (1982).
The assignment-of-income principle generally requires that income will
be taxed to the person who earned it or owned the income-producing prop-
erty. See M. CHrmELSTEm, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 11 8.01-.02, 9.02 (1980).
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vent the evasion of tax liability,92 Congress promulgated special
statutory rules to supplement the partnership recognition rules.93
In a post-mortem farm and ranch context, any partnerships which
may exist commonly does so between family members. Therefore,
it is particularly important to discuss the family partnership rules
of section 704(e).
D. Definition of a Family Partnership
1. Early Common Law
In the early 1900's the courts were willing to find the existence
of a family partnership if the arrangement constituted a partner-
ship under local law. This situation began to change in the 1930's,
however, when the Supreme Court handed down several landmark
decisions concerning the "assignment of income". 94 A number of
The leading cases in the area are Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Many of the elements of these cases
are involved when a parent seeks to make his children partners, causing part-
nership distributive shares to be taxed to the children, rather than the par-
ent. These elements are also present in partnership arrangements between
husbands and wives. In the husband and wife income context, however, the
impact of the assignment-of-income principal has been reduced by I.R.C.
§ 170, which provides that a husband and wife may elect to file a joint income
tax return. See I.R.C. § 170 (1980). The principle still has great impact in
other related party transactions. It also has an analogous application in the
estate tax area, even between spouses.
"Tax reduction is not evil if you do not do it evilly." Gunn, Tax Avoidance,
76 MICH. L. REV. 733, 733 (1978) (quoting Murphy Logging Co. v. United States,
378 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1967)). In contrast to the quotation, Professor Gunn
gave an almost purely negative critique of what he considers to be a loophole
in the income tax. "Where there is an income tax, the just man will pay more
and the unjust less on the same amount of income." McMahon, Expanding
the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of Children and Parents, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 60 (1981) (quoting PLATo, REPUBLIC, bk. 1, 343-d (Jowett
Trans. 1888)).
Another commentator writing on special valuation of farm land for estate
tax purposes, see I.R.C. § 2032A (1981), noted: "One is reminded, when read-
ing the debates on this provision, that taxation is a means of economic, social,
and political ends as well as a means to raise revenue." Note, Material Partic-
ipation and the Valuation of Farm Land for Estate Tax Purposes Under the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, 66 Ky. L.J. 848, 854 (1978). The commentator chose to
include in his hypothesis a quote from Mortimer Caplan, former Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue who said: 'There is one difference between a
tax collector and a taxidermist-the taxidermist leaves the hide." Id. at 848.
92. See supra note 90.
93. I.R.C. §§ 761 (1977), 7701(a)(2) (1976).
94 See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Burnett v. Wells, 289 U.S.
670 (1933); Burnett v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376 (1930); Commissioner v. Olds, 60 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1932); Crane v. Com-
missioner, 19 B.T.A. 577 (1930); Phelps v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 1248 (1928).
See also Lawson, supra note 39, at A-3.
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Internal Revenue Service victories created a substantial body of
law which was used to restrict the use of income-splitting devices.
And, due to the income-splitting opportunity created by a family
partnership, a series of rules was designed to limit the availability
of family partnership status.9 5 As a result of an inconsistent posi-
tion taken by the Tax Court, irreconcilable decisions9 6 left a con-
fusing body of law. Because of conflicting decisions regarding the
recognition of family partnerships, the Supreme Court agreed to
review the question,97 and in 1946, the Court handed down Com-
missioner v. Tower9 8 and Lusthaus v. Commissioner,9 9 which pro-
vided guidelines for both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service.100
In Commissioner v. Tower,1O1 a business had been operated by
the taxpayer as a corporation for several years, the taxpayer
owned eighty-nine percent of the outstanding stock. Due to sub-
stantial profits and increased taxes, the taxpayer was advised to
reorganize the business as a partnership, with his wife as a princi-
pal partner. In order to reorganize the business, the taxpayer
transferred 38 percent of the corporate stock to his wife on the con-
dition that she place the corporate assets represented by those
shares into the new partnership. The corporation was liquidated
and a limited partnership was formed, with the taxpayer contribut-
ing 51 percent of the capital as a limited partner, and an unrelated
third party contributing the remainder of the capital. In its analy-
sis of the arrangement, the Court recognized that "[t] here can be
no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circum-
stances become partners for tax, as for other, purposes."'0 2 How-
ever, in order to limit the growing number of arrangements which
were clearly devised to split income, the Court required that the
wife either invest capital which originated from her, or, she must
contribute substantially to the control and management of the
business, or otherwise perform vital additional services.103
95. Lawson, supra note 39.
96. Compare Tower v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), with Johnston v. Com-
missioner, 3 T.C. 799 (1944). See also J. RAmNic & M. JOHNSON, 2A FEDERAL
INcOME, GnT, AND ESTATE TAXATION § 6.05 (1982).
97. See Z. CAvrrcH, 1 BusinEss ORGANIZATIONS wrrH TAX PLANNING § 9.04[2]
(1982).
98. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
99. 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
100. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 284 (1946). For further discussion, see
Lawson, supra note 39.
101. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
102. Id.
103. See generally Spada & Ludtke, Dispositions of Partnership Interests-Gifts,
Incorporations, Etc., 286 TAX MGmT. (Portfolio) (BNA) A-9 to -10 (1973).
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Lusthaus v. Commissioner,O4 decided on the same day as
Tower, involved a similar factual setting. As in Tower, the Com-
missioner had challenged the validity of a family partnership for
federal income tax purposes. Affirming the Tax Court, the
Supreme Court held that the parties had failed to create a valid
partnership, finding that the partnership arrangements were
merely superficial and did not actually change the husband's eco-
nomic interest in the business. As a result of Tower and Lusthaus,
the taxpayer had to show that the wife had contributed either orig-
inal capital or vital services to the entity in order for a family part-
nership to be sustained.105
2. The Culbertson Decision
In response to the lower courts' disagreement as to the proper
interpretation of the Tower-Lusthaus "original capital and vital
services" test,10 6 the Supreme Court reviewed the test in 1949, in
another landmark decision, Commissioner v. Culbertson.O7 In Cul-
bertson, Coon and Culbertson were partners in a cattle-breeding
operation. Because Coon was seventy-nine years of age and in ill
health, he agreed to sell his interest in the business to Culbertson,
if Culbertson would promise, in turn, to sell a one-half interest to
Culbertson's four sons. Culbertson complied with Coon's wishes
and sold a one-half interest to his sons in exchange for a promis-
sory note. The operation conducted business as a partnership, but
only one son supplied services to the operation. The promissory
note was paid off with profits from the operation and gifts from
Culbertson. 0 8
The Court reaffirmed the Tower decision in part,109 holding that
one must contribute either capital or services to be recognized as a
partner. The Court, however, rejected the contention that Tower
and Lusthaus established specific criteria for the determination of
partnership status, and indicated that the lower court's refusal to
recognize a family partner unless he contributed either "vital serv-
ices" or "original capital" to the partnership was an error in em-
phasis.110 The Culbertson Court held that:
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a
partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standards sup-
posedly established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the
facts-the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its provi-
104. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
105. See D. KELLEY & D. LuDTmE, supra note 10, at § 3.58.
106. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
107. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
108. For a discussion of Culbertson, see Lawson, supra note 39.
109. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
110. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrm]mE, supra note 5, at 14.01 [2].
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sions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, relation-
ship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions, the
actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used, and any
other facts throwing light on their true intent-the parties in good faith
and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the pres-
ent conduct of the enterprise.1 1 1
Following Culbertson the status of family partnerships was
even less clear than it was before.11 2 If original capital or vital
services had been contributed, partnerships were generally up-
held, but in the absence of these factors, courts focused on the true
intentions of the parties." 3 The definition of "intent" accounted
for much of the difficulty in the family partnership cases decided
prior to 1951. Even now, "intent" to be a partner is requisite, since
a partnership is a contractual relationship. Although objective
facts-such as participation, formalities, and representations-
may be evidence of intent, those factors do not themselves become
the criteria."4 Thus, a determination of partnership status for fed-
eral tax purposes is viewed primarily as a question of the subjec-
tive intent of the parties involved in the arrangement,"15 even
though the Code fails to expressly refer to intent." 6
3. Congressional Response to Culbertson
In 1951 Congress moved to end the confusion surrounding the
validity of family partnerships for income tax purposes, by enact-
111. 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949).
112. Z. CAvrrcH, 1 BusiNEss ORGANIZATONS wrrH TAX PLANNING § 9.04[2] [c]
(1982).
113. Stanchfield v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1951); Batman v. Commis-
sioner, 189 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951); Feldman v.
Commissioner, 186 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1950); Barrett v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d
150 (1st Cir. 1950); Slifka v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1950); Funai v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1950).
114. For further discussion, see J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 96, at § 6.06.
115. See, e.g., Dorothy L. Huckle, 37 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 240, 244 (1968) (existence of a
partnership is a "pure question of fact" and "the intent of the parties is the
most important factor to be considered").
According to decisions of other courts, intent may be evidenced by the
following objective factors: (1) joint contribution of capital or services for the
purpose of carrying on a trade or business; (2) sharing of profits and losses;
(3) mutual control of the business; (4) the agreement between and among
the parties and their conduct; (5) representations of partnership status to
third persons; (6) separate books of accounts for the enterprise; and (7) hold-
ing title to the business property in the partnership name. See, e.g., Adams v.
United States, 328 F. Supp. 228 (D. Neb. 1971); Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20, 34-
35 (1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi; Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964);
Lucia Chase Ewing, 20 T.C. 216 (1953), affid on other grounds, 213 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1954). See also, Spada & Ruge, supra note 63, at A-5.
116. Spada & Ruge, supra note 63, at A-5.
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ing Code section 704(e) (1).117 As explained in the Committee Re-
port,li8 the purpose of section 704(e) (1) was:
[T]o harmonize the rules governing interests in the so-called family part-
nership with those generally applicable to other forms of property or busi-
ness... [and to make clear] that, however the owner of a partnership
interest may have acquired such interest, the income is taxable to the
owner, if he is the real owner.119
Section 704(e) (1) thus creates a two-pronged test which recog-
nizes a person as a partner for income tax purposes if: (1) he owns
a capital interest in a partnership, in which (2) capital is a material
income-producing factor,120 whether such interest was acquired by
purchase or gift. Congress has thus abolished the "original capi-
tal" test for partnerships, in which capital is a material income-
producing factor, at least for the purposes of income taxation.
4. Impact of Section 704(e) (1) on Family Farm Partnerships
Because farming is a capital-intensive occupation,121 it seems
obvious that section 704(e) (1) will almost always apply to farm
and ranch enterprises. This is affirmed by a regulation which
states that capital is a material income-producing factor "if a sub-
stantial portion of the gross income of the business is attributable
to the employment of capital in the business conducted by the
partnership."122 Capital is generally considered a material in-
come-producing factor if a partnership's business requires "sub-
stantial investment in plant, machinery, or other equipment."' 23
117. I.R.C. § 704(e) (1) (1976) provides: "A person shall be recognized as a partner
for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such in-
terest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person."
118. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2008, 2008-09. See generally Note, Family Partnerships and the
Revenue Act of 1951, 61 YALE L.J. 541, 544-51 (1952).
119. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 39 (1951); H.a. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1951).
120. I.R.C. § 704(e) (1) (1976).
121. Capital normally is a material income-producing factor in a farm or ranch
partnership, since such operations are capital intensive. D. KELLEY & D.
LuDTKE, supra note 10, at § 7.47.
The Woodbury partnership was in the ranching and farming busi-
ness, and the capital contributions to it consisted of ranch land, farm
machinery, and cattle. Without belittling the valuable services con-
tributed by Glen and Leo to the partnership, the quality of the land,
the efficiency of the machinery and the development of the cattle
were critical to its success. Thus we think the capital contributed to
this partnership was "a material income-producing factor" within the
intendment of section 704(e) (1).
Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180, 191 (1967).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (iv) (1982).
123. Id. See Reddig v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958); Hartman v. Commis-
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However, the determination of whether capital is a material in-
come-producing factor in the business of a partnership is to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis with reference to all relevant
facts and circumstances.1 24
The second prong of the partnership test of section 704(e) (1)
focuses on whether the partner owns a "capital interest." The Reg-
ulation defines a "capital interest in a partnership" as "an interest
in the assets of the partnership, which is distributable to the owner
of the capital interest upon his withdrawal from the partnership or
upon liquidation of the partnership."'125 It is important to note that
ownership may be attained by either purchase or gift.126 Further-
more, the Regulation states:
If the reality of the transfer of interest is satisfactorily established, the
motives for the transaction are generally immaterial. However, the pres-
ence or absence of a tax-avoidance motive is one of the many factors to be
considered in determining the reality of the ownership of a capital interest
acquired by gift.127
The Regulations have established a number of tests to deter-
mine whether a donee or purchaser actually owns a partnership
interest that has been transferred to him. No single factor is deter-
minative; the reality of ownership can only be judged in light of the
transaction as a whole.128 The factors expressly delineated by the
Regulations include: (1) substantial participation in the control
and management of the business; 129 (2) actual distribution to a
partner of the entire amount or a major portion of the taxpayer's
distributive share of the business income for the partner's sole use
and benefit;130 and (3) conduct of the business as a partnership.131
sioner, 43 T.C. 105 (1964) (employment of capital to finance inventory in ac-
counts receivable was "material").
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (iv) (1982).
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (v) (1982). In Nichols v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1322
(1959), it was suggested that a wife's community property interest and prop-
erty utilized in her husband's business, would be regarded as capital owner-
ship for purposes of determining whether she and her husband were partners
in community property states. But see Hornback v. United States, 298 F.
Supp. 977 (D. Mo. 1969).
126. LR.C. § 704(e)(1)-(2) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1982).
127. Id.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (1982). See also Z. CAvrrcH, BusmNEss ORGANIZA-
TIONS wrrH TAX PLANNING § 9.04[4] (1982).
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iv) (1982).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (v) (1982).
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vi) (1982):
Conduct of Partnership Business. In determining the reality of
the donee's ownership of a capital interest in a partnership, consider-
ation shall be given to whether the donee is actually treated as a
partner in the operation of the business. Whether or not the donee
had been held out publicly as a partner in the conduct of the busi-
ness, in relations with customers, or with creditors or other sources
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The Committee Reports recognized that cases would arise
where the gift or sale of a partnership interest was a mere sham.132
Therefore, Congress specifically provided that "[t]he amendment
leaves the Commissioner and the courts free to inquire in any case
whether the donee or purchaser actually owns the interest in the
partnership which the transferor purports to have given or sold
him."'1 33 Finally, Congress recognized that cases would arise
"where the transferor retains so many of the incidents of owner-
ship that he will continue to be recognized as a substantial owner
of financing, is of primary significance. Other factors of significance
in this connection include:
(a) Compliance with local ownership, fictitious names, and
business registration statutes.
(b) Control of business bank accounts.
(c) Recognition of the donee's rights and distributions of the
partnership property and profits.
(d) Recognition of the donee's interest in insurance policies,
leases, and other business contracts in litigation affecting busi-
ness.
(e) The existence of written agreements, records, or memo-
randa, contemporaneous with the taxable year or years con-
cerned, establishing the nature of the partnership agreement
and the rights and liabilities of the respective partners.(f) Filing of partnership tax returns as required by law.
However, despite formal compliance with the above factors, other
circumstances may indicate that the donor has retained substantial
ownership of the interest purportedly transferred to the donee.
Id.
In Acuff v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 162 (1960), affd, 296 F.2d 725 (6th Cir.
1961), the failure to comply with all these formalities of conveyancing and
recording contributed to the denial of recognition of the partnership.
Note that the filing of partnership tax returns as required by law is only a
factor to which consideration will be given in determining whether a partner-
ship exists. Rev. Proc. 81-11, 1981-1 C.B. 651, sets forth the procedures under
which partnerships with ten or fewer partners will not be subject to the pen-
alty imposed by I.R.C. § 6698 for failure to file a partnership return.
A partnership composed of ten or fewer partners of a type that
has not historically filed a partnership return, such as a family farm
partnership, or, in some cases, co-ownerships of property will be con-
sidered to have met the reasonable cause test and will not be subject
to the penalty imposed by section 6698 of the Code for the failure to
file a partnership return, provided that the partnership of any of the
partners establishes, if so requested by the Service, that all partners
have fully reported their shares of the income, deductions, and cred-
its of the partnership on their timely-filed income tax returns.
Rev. Proc. 81-11, 1981-1 C.B. 651.
The Service's position reflects that of the Conference Committee Report
concerning I.R.C. § 6698. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221,
reprinted in 1978-3 C.B. 521, 555. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-1445, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 75, reprinted in 1978-3 C.B. 181, 249; S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 106, reprinted in 1978-3 C.B. 315, 404.
132. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 33, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2000, 2000.
133. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951).
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of the interest which he purports to have given away."134
Regulation section 1.704-1(e) (1) (iii)135 provides that controls
retained by the donor are important in determining whether the
donor has relinquished ownership of a capital interest.136 The Reg-
ulation specifically delineates four types of controls which tend to
negate the reality of a transfer of partnership interests.137 These
types of control relate to the distributions of partnership income,
the sale or liquidation of the donee's interests, the management of
assets essential to partnership business, and management pow-
ers.13 8 The legislative history of section 704(e) (1) indicates that
the retention of a particular control by the donor or a restriction on
the donee's ownership should affect the income tax liability of a
family partnership only if it is not a normal or customary incident
of membership status in a partnership of unrelated parties.139
In Commissioner v. Culbertson,140 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of real ownership by the donee, concluding that
"whether he is free to, and does, enjoy the fruits of the partnership
is strongly indicative of the reality of his participation in the enter-
prise."14 Similarly, the Regulation emphasizes the donee's con-
134. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 2000, 2000. For a general overview of the legislative history see R.
RICE & T. RICE, supra note 16, ch. 16, at § 31.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (1) (ili) (1982):
Requirement of Complete Transfer to Donee. A donee or pur-
chaser of a capital interest in a partnership is not recognized as a
partner under the principles of Section 704(e) (1) unless such inter-
est is acquired in a bona fide transaction, not a mere sham for tax
avoidance or evasion purposes .... To be recognized, a transfer
must vest dominion and control of the partnership interest in the
transferee. The existence of such dominion and control in the donee
is to be determined from all the facts and circumstances .... Trans-
actions between members of a family will be closely scrutinized, and
the circumstances, not only at the time of the purported transfer but
also during the periods preceding it and following it, will be taken
into consideration in determining the bonafides or lack of bonafides
of the purported gift or sale. A partnership may be recognized for
income tax purposes as to some partners but not as to others.
Id.
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974); Krause v.
Commissioner, 497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974); Payton v. United States, 425 F.2d
1324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Ballou v. United States,
370 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1966); Parker v. Westover, 248 F.2d. 490 (9th Cir. 1957).
136. For a general discussion of controls retained by the donor, see Spada &
Ludtke, supra note 103, at A-11.
137. See, e.g., W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHrrMIRE, supra note 5, at 14.03.
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (ii) (1982).
139. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 40, reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2000, 2000.
140. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
141. Id. at 747.
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trol over income as being essential to a valid partnership. The
Regulation states that the income tax liability of a family partner-
ship may be affected by "[r] etention of control of the distribution
of amounts of income or restrictions on the distribution of amounts
of income (other than amounts retained in the partnership annu-
ally with the consent of the partners, including the donee partner,
for the reasonable needs of the business)." 4 2 If the donor of a
partnership capital interest limits the donee's right to "liquidate or
sell his interest in the partnership at his discretion without
financial detriment,"' 43 it may be inferred that the donor has re-
tained sufficient control over the donated interest to continue to be
treated as the owner for income tax purposes. However, reason-
able business restrictions may be imposed on the disposition of
partnership interest, particularly if the restrictions are binding on
both the donor and the donee.144
The Regulation further states that the donor's retention of con-
trol over assets essential to the business will be a factor in deter-
mining the existence of a partnership.145 The Regulation does not
elaborate on this requirement except by citing "assets leased to
the alleged partnership"146 as an example. It should be noted that
Mimeograph 6767'47 gave a similar, though narrower, example of
essential assets, referring to assets "leased at will or for a rela-
tively short term." 4 By retaining the right to withdraw the essen-
tial assets, the donor effectively retains the right to cause a
termination of the partnership business, thus rendering the do-
nee's partnership interest valueless. Therefore, it is logical to con-
clude that the retention of a right to withdraw essential assets
would jeopardize the validity of the partnership.
Finally, explicit in the Regulation, is the retention of manage-
ment powers. 149 Retention of business management control or vot-
ing control by the donor, as is common in ordinary business
relationships, is not necessarily inconsistent with normal relation-
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (a) (1982). It is at least interesting to note that
in the context of a case requiring interpretation of the Medicaid regulations
Judge Friendly stated that "[t] here should be no such form of reference as 45
C.F.R. § 248.3(c) (1) (ii) (B) (2)... a draftsman who has gotten himself in such
a position requiring anything like this should make a fresh start." Freidman
v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976). The tax regulations are replete
with such forms of reference.
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (b) (1982).
144. See Middlebrook v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 385 (1949); Bellamy v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C. 867 (1950).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (c) (1982).
146. Id.
147. 1952-1 C.B. 111.
148. Id. at 114.
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii) (d) (1982).
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ships among partners (provided the donee is free to liquidate his
interest at his discretion without financial detriment).150 But, just
as the retention of management control by the donor indicates that
the donor has retained effective ownership of the donated capital
interest, substantial participation by the donee in the control and
management of a partnership's business "is strong evidence of a
donee partner's exercise of dominion and control over his
interest."' 5 '
Whether a donor's retained control over gifted partnership in-
terests is accomplished directly, or indirectly, it should be noted
that such retained control will subject the arrangement to close
scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service. 152 Therefore, a donor in
an inter vivos transfer cannot avoid the problem by utilizing a re-
lated entity to control the partnership. 5 3 The Regulation prohibits
such indirect control by a donor. 54
E. Relationship Between Income Tax and Estate Tax Treatment
In the post-mortem estate planning context, the issue of re-
tained control under income tax statutes interrelates with retained
control under the estate tax statutes.155 For example, under Code
section 2036 (a) (1), the retention of a right to the income from prop-
erty conveyed by gift will cause the property to be included in the
donor's gross estate. 5 6 Furthermore, under Code section
2038 (a) (1), and the Regulations thereunder, property will be in-
cluded in a decedent's gross estate when the decedent has re-
tained the power to transfer the enjoyment of the property. 5 7
Thus, if a donor receives substantially all of the partnership in-
come or retains the right to determine the recipient of such in-
come, the Service may seek to include any partnership interest in
the donor's gross estate. 58
The partnership income tax regulations acknowledge that a mi-
nor can be a partner for tax purposes, even if his interest is not
held in trust. 59 This acknowledgment adds weight to the position
150. Id.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iv) (1982).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iii) (1982).
153. See Lawson, supra note 39, at A-10.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iii) (1982).
155. See supra notes 28-38 & 86-88 and accompanying text.
156. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1) (1976).
157. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (1982).
158. See IR.S. Letter Rul. (CCH) 7824005 (Mar. 2, 1978). See also D. KELLEY & D.
LUDYKE, supra note 10, at § 7.48b.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1982). See, e.g., Finlen v. Healy, 187 F. Supp.
434 (D. Mont. 1960); Green v. Arnold, 87 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1949), aff'd per
curiam, 186 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1951).
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that informal parent-child partnerships are valid. However, the
minor must be shown to be "competent to manage his own prop-
erty and participate in any partnership activities in accordance
with his interest in the property."160 It may be difficult for the typi-
cal parent-child partnership to meet this criterion; it may be im-
possible to demonstrate that the minor had sufficient dominion
and control over the interest to be recognized as its owner for tax
purposes.161
Of course, not all post-mortem recognition of partnerships will
be found in a donor-donee context. In Craig v. United States,162
the federal district court recognized the existence of an informal
partnership based on evidence of typical farm wife services, and
the usual understanding between the farm husband and wife that
the fruits of the arrangement were owned equally. The issue arose
as to the respective ownerships of the husband and wife in their
personal property, because most of the real property was owned in
joint tenancy. The court found that the wife had substantially con-
tributed to the acquisition of the family property, and that the hus-
band and wife had intended to join income and labor as equal
partners, in order to establish and enlarge their family farm. The
court emphasized the fact that very little was taken from the farm
for the couple's personal enjoyment; rather, the fruits of their labor
were reinvested in the farm. 63
In the recent case of Estate of Guy Kjorvestad, Sr. ,164 the fed-
eral district court found that there was no credible evidence of an
informal farm partnership between the husband and wife. As a re-
sult, the court allowed the taxation of all farm property in the dece-
dent husband's estate, rather than one-half of the property, as
proposed by the wife.165 Although the court found that the wife
had contributed to the farm operations by performing such tasks
as occasionally milking the cows, selling eggs, supervising butcher-
ing and preparing meals, the court concluded that these services
could not serve as adequate and full consideration in money, or
money's worth, for a claim to a partnership interest in the farming
operation.166 On the contrary, the court found that the wife's pri-
mary responsibilities were essentially domestic in nature, and that
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (vii) (1982).
161. See Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962); Spiesman v. Com-
missioner, 260 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1958); Bialock v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 649
(1961).
162. 451 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1978).
163. For a thorough discussion of Craig, see D. KELLEY & D. Luri, supra note
10, at § 3.68.
164. 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) $ 81-1635 (D.N.D. 1981).
165. Id.
166. Id. at $ 81-1637.
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she had little control over the actual operation of the farm. The
court found that the decedent had maintained sole control over
farming operations, since he had personally supervised the busi-
ness aspects of the farm operation. Testimony revealed that the
decedent had made crop selection decisions, kept the books, hired
and paid farm labor, and managed the financial decisions for the
farming operation.167 The court recognized that the farm had ex-
panded markedly after the marriage, but concluded that the wife
had contributed no material assets to cause the expansion.168 The
court relied on Culbertson, 69 in concluding that no partnership
existed.17 0
Many cases decided under joint-tenancy tax law may be analo-
gized to a partnership context.' 7 ' In Estate of Jack Robins Ens-
ley,17 2 the decedent's widow argued that all of the property owned
jointly as of the date of death was acquired during her marriage to
the decedent, that she had contributed toward this acquisition in
the form of services rendered to the business, and that her partici-
pation was equal to that of the decedent. The Tax Court stated
that, where a husband and wife operate a business under a part-
nership or other agreement to share profits, and jointly-held prop-
erty is acquired with the profits of that business, each spouse's
services constitute full and adequate consideration for the funds
received from the other, and that each used the value of the con-
sideration to purchase the property. 7 3 The court found that the
petitioner and the decedent had informally agreed to share profits,
and that her services were equal in value to those performed by
the decedent. However, the court also stressed that the petitioner
had not proved the monetary value of her services or traced profit
from the business as the source of funds for jointly-owned prop-
erty. Therefore, only a very small portion of the contested prop-
erty was excluded from the gross estate. 7 4
In a similar case, Estate of Everett Otte,l73 the Tax Court held
that the work of a surviving farm wife constituted consideration in
money, or money's worth, for one-half of the property held by her
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
170. 47 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 81-1635, 81-1639 (D.N.D. 1981).
171. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Neel,
235 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1956); Singer v. Shaughanessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1952); Rogan v. Kammerdiner, 140 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1944); Berkowitz v. Com-
missioner, 108 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1939); Kihchel v. United States, 105 F. Supp.
523 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
172. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1627 (1977).
173. Id. at 1631.
174. Id.
175. 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72-317 (1972).
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and her husband as tenants by the entirety. This decision con-
cerned a tract of land which had been held in the husband's name,
individually, until it was placed in joint-tenancy shortly before
death. Although Otte presented the issue of joint-tenancy, rather
than recognition of a partnership, the decision seems to implicitly
recognize a common-law theory of partnership. 7 6
In Otte, the court emphasized that the parties had each contrib-
uted services to the management and operation of the farming en-
terprise. 7 7 The parties had pooled their earnings in order to
purchase substantially all of the real and personal property of the
farm operations. Furthermore, all of the farm debts were paid out
of farm earnings jointly realized by the parties.178 The court found
that the surviving wife had contributed to the farm operations by
assuming full responsibility for a chicken and egg production pro-
cess, as well as by taking an active role in the management of
other aspects of the farming operations.179 The court expressly
found that "her activities ... were more extensive than those of an
ordinary housewife not residing on a farm."180 Thus, it appears
that the proper involvement standard may be that of an "average"
family, rather than that of an "average" farm family.
In Woodbury v. Commissioner,181 a father-son partnership was
recognized where the father had contributed about $100,000, and
the son $300,000, to the venture. Although the son was a minor, he
had performed labor and participated in the management of the
176. The common law can be stated as follows:
Ordinarily, real estate bought with partnership funds, for partner-
ship purposes and appropriated to partnership uses or entered and
carried in the accounts of the firm as partnership assets, is regarded
in equity as partnership property, irrespective of the name in which
legal title is taken.
68 C.J.S. Partnerships § 72 (1954).
This area of tax law also seems to parallel divorce law. The spouses, in
dissolution, may also have legally recognized business interests in property
that are equivalent to ownership. When the spouses jointly operate a busi-
ness, a partnership may exist. Gerlach v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R2d (P-H) %
74-5132 (Ct. Cl. 1973). As a partner, each spouse owns a portion of the part-
nership property. Whether a partnership exists is a question of fact. If one
spouse receives property as a gift from the other spouse during the marriage,
the donee spouse is the owner of that property. Even if the title is not
changed, the donee may have legal ownership of the property. 1982 P-H Di-
vorce Taxation 6205. Note, however, the concept of marital property as a
property interest in the context of divorce law is not relevant for federal tax
purposes. The property included as marital property is either owned individ-
ually or co-owned for purposes of taxation. 1982 P-H Divorce Taxation T 6206.
177. 1972 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,076, at 72-318 (March 28, 1972).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180 (1967).
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ranching enterprise. The Tax Court found that the son's services
were about equal to those of the father, and that equal allocations
for personal services had been made from the partnership income,
with the remainder divided according to their capital interests.
However, the court refused to find that the land used in the ranch
operations had been held by the partnership. The court empha-
sized that title to the farmland was in the father's name and, as
such, the son had no interest in the property. The court placed
great weight on the fact that, under Montana law, an estate in real
property can be transferred only by operation of law, or by a writ-
ten instrument.182 The court concluded by noting that the petition-
ers had offered no evidence of any gift of real property, other than
a declaration by the parties that a gift was intended.183 This is par-
ticularly troubling in the context of post-mortem recognition of in-
formal partnerships, since the time to transfer title to real property
has passed. However, the court appeared to recognize that if there
is strong evidence from which to infer a partnership relationship,
such evidence may also support the allocation of land ownership.
Finally, partnerships must also be distinguished from employ-
ment, or independent contractor, relationships. One hallmark of
an employee-employer relationship is the subservience of the em-
ployee to the employer. The absence of a right to participate in
overall management and control of a business or venture is of par-
ticular importance in distinguishing partners from employees or
servants. 84 Finally, the key distinction between employees,
agents, or independent contractors and partners is the presence or
absence of substantial capital interests. 85
182. Id. at 194.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., James v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 930 (1951), affd per curiam, 197 F.2d
813 (5th Cir. 1952).
185. See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1963); Love-
land v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 5 (1949). Another of the most common and
perplexing questions that arises in the tax classification of business arrange-
ments is whether the co-ownership of property constitutes a partnership.
Nelson, supra note 7, at § 15.01. For purposes of distinguishing mere co-own-
ership from partnership, the Regulation emphasizes the level and extent of
joint activity of the co-owners with respect to the property. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.761-1(a) (1972). Thus, the Regulation states that the mere co-ownership
and rental of property is not a partnership, even though the co-tenants jointly
maintain, keep in repair, and rent or lease the property. Id. On the other
hand, the Regulation states that a partnership exists if co-owners of an apart-
ment building lease space and, in addition, provide services to lessees, either
directly or through an agent. Id. Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261, indicates
that the level of joint activity required to convert mere co-owners into part-
ners may be significantly greater than joint maintenance and net leasing. It
held that co-owners of an apartment project were not partners, even though,
through an agent, they actively leased apartment units and provided "cus-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Somewhat like the tort-feasor who must take the plaintiff with
the eggshell skull,186 the post-mortem estate planner takes the de-
cedent's estate plan as it lies. In addition to the more traditional
methods of post-mortem estate planning,187 there is an opportu-
nity, and a duty, both to the client and the government fisc, to prop-
erly reflect the decedent's interest in the final estate tax return.
The careful planner may be able to include or exclude property
from the gross estate by the recognition of informal family farm
partnerships. However, this method of altering estate contents is
difficult at best, and perilous at worst, since the definition of a part-
nership for tax purposes is both broad and imprecise.
Thomas Earl Geu '83
tomary tenant services" to the lessees. Id. This question, however, is not as
important in the context of post-mortem planning because, if co-ownership of
property can be established without using the informal partnership theory,
there is no need to prove that an informal partnership exists.
186. In tort law, if the plaintiff suffers any foreseeable impact or injury, even if
relatively minor, the defendant is generally held liable for any additional un-
foreseen physical consequences. This principle is illustrated by the hypo-
thetical case of a plaintiff who, unbeknownst to the defendant, has a skull of
eggshell thickness. If the defendant negligently inflicts a minor impact on
this skull, but because of this hidden defect the plaintiff dies, the defendant
will be liable for his death. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 262 (4th ed. 1971). The
rule is sometimes expressed by saying that the defendant takes his plaintiff
as he finds him. Watson v. Rinderknecht, 84 N.W. 798 (Minn. 1901).
187. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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